We construct an uncoupled randomized strategy of repeated play such that, if every player plays according to it, mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game. The strategy requires very little in terms of information about the game, as players' actions are based only on their own past payoffs. Moreover, in a variant of the procedure, players need not know that there are other players in the game and that payoffs are determined through other players' actions. The procedure works for finite generic games and is based on appropriate modifications of a simple stochastic learning rule introduced by Foster and Young [12] .
Introduction
We construct a stochastic learning rule such that, if all players play according to it, then mixed action profiles will converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of a generic game. An important feature is that it requires very little in terms of what players need to know about the underlying game. Moreover, in a variant of the basic rule, convergence obtains even if players do not know whether they are playing against other players or whether there are other players. What they do need to know are their own past realized payoffs which they need to observe over sufficiently long periods of time. The paper thus contributes to the theory of learning, by showing existence of globally converging learning rules, possibly providing intuition for why some large interactive systems might be at or close to Nash equilibrium behavior.
The procedure is a variant of the regret testing learning rule introduced by Foster and Young [12] . Essentially, time is divided into sufficiently long periods such that, at the beginning of each period, each player chooses a mixed action at random and plays according to the corresponding distribution for the duration of the period. If the player could not have performed much better by playing some other fixed action throughout the (just elapsed) period, then it repeats the previously played mixed action for the next period;
otherwise the player randomly selects a new mixed action and plays it during the next period. The procedure thus implements a kind of exhaustive search with agents separately testing their own actions through summary statistics of past payoffs. (In this sense, it is related to reinforcement or aspiration models such as Erev and Roth [8] and Börgers and Sarin [4] , see also Fudenberg and Levine [15] .) The basic variation we study adds experimentation to Foster and Young's procedure so that, with small probability, players sample a new mixed action even if they could not have done much better with any fixed action over the previous period. (This is similar to some of the learning models with mutations or persistent randomness such as Kandori, Mailath and Rob [30] and Young [37] , see also Fudenberg and Levine [15] .) Among 1 other things, this guarantees that the process of mixed action profiles taken at the beginning of each period is an irreducible Markov chain.
More specifically, the setup is the following. We consider repeated play of a finite N -player normal form game. At each time instant t = 1, 2, . . . , player i ∈ N chooses a mixed action σ i t ∈ Σ i depending on the history and selects an action s i t randomly according to the distribution of σ i t , i ∈ N . In the basic setup, we assume that after taking an action at time t, player i observes the actions s −i t played by the rest of the players. (This assumption of standard monitoring is significantly weakened in Section 6.) However, we focus our attention on uncoupled procedures in the sense that each player i knows its own payoff function γ i but ignores the payoff functions of the rest of the players, see Hart and Mas-Colell [23, 24] . We also allow for randomized procedures in the sense that, at each time instant t, player i has access to a random variable χ i,t whose value it can use in determining σ i t where the χ i,t are independent and (say) uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1].
Our main objective here is to see whether uncoupled randomized procedures can lead to Nash equilibrium. Or, more precisely, does there exist a randomized uncoupled strategy 1 such that, regardless of what the underlying game is, if all players follow such a strategy, mixed action profiles σ t = (σ 1 t , . . . , σ N t ) converge, almost surely, to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game? We answer this in the affirmative for generic games, thus providing a strong possibility or existence result. Previous work on uncoupled procedures either did not obtain global convergence for all (or almost all) N -player games, or obtained convergence to weaker notions of equilibrium and with weaker notions of convergence; see for example the discussions in Foster and Young [12] and Hart and Mas-Colell [23] . Moreover, as with Foster and Young's regret testing, our variant also extends to the case where players observe their own past realized payoffs but not the actions of the other players.
1 Throughout the paper we use the term (mixed) action to denote the distribution σ i t used to play the stage game at any time instant t and use the term strategy for the repeated game strategy. In the terminology of Hart [18] , our procedure belongs to the class of adaptive heuristics and is to be located between evolutionary dynamics and sophisticated learning dynamics in terms of the sophistication of the players; see also Fudenberg and Levine [15] on this.
We refer to this case as the unknown game model.
Perhaps the first such universal convergence result was shown by Foster and Vohra [9] , who proved the existence of adaptive procedures such that the joint empirical frequencies of play, P s,t = 1 t t τ =1 I sτ =s , s ∈ S, converge to the set of correlated equilibria of the game, see also Foster and Vohra [10] , Fudenberg and Levine [14, 16] , Hart and Mas-Colell [19, 20, 22] , Stoltz and Lugosi [35] , and Cahn [5] . The original result of Foster and Vohra shows that if players base their actions on a calibrated forecast of the other players' actions then convergence to correlated equilibria takes place in the above mentioned sense. Kakade and Foster [28] take these ideas further and show that if all players play according to a best response to a certain common "almost deterministic" well-calibrated forecaster (the existence of which they also prove) then the joint empirical frequencies of play converge not only to the set of correlated equilibria but, in fact, to the convex hull of the set of Nash equilibria. Foster and Young [11, 12] introduce two procedures in which, asymptotically, the joint mixed strategy profiles are within distance of the set of Nash equilibria in a fraction of at least 1 − of time, though almost sure convergence is not achieved.
On the negative side, Hart and Mas-Colell [23] show that it is impossible to achieve convergence to Nash equilibrium for all games if one is restricted to deterministic uncoupled strategies. More recently, in [24] they extend the impossibility result to stationary uncoupled randomized strategies that have bounded recall. By "bounded recall" they mean that there is a finite integer T such that each player bases its play only on the last T rounds of play. At the same time, by relaxing the bounded recall assumption, for every > 0, they show a randomized stationary uncoupled procedure for which mixed actions converge almost surely to an -Nash equilibrium. Their procedure relies heavily on the assumption that other players's actions are observable. In contrast, our procedure, while extending to the unknown game case, is not stationary (and neither satisfies bounded recall). Overall, their results reveal that there is a fine line between what is possible in terms of convergence to Nash equilibrium by uncoupled strategies and what is not. Our paper further contributes to the filling of this gap.
More specifically, in Theorem 1 we prove almost sure convergence of mixed action profiles to a Nash equilibrium for generic games, which include almost all games in the sense of the Lebesgue measure over the set of all finite N -player normal form games. Theorem 2 establishes the existence of an uncoupled randomized strategy that achieves almost sure convergence to anNash equilibrium without any restriction on the game. Finally, in Theorem 3
we drop the standard monitoring assumption and show convergence in the senses above in the unknown game model. Hart and Mas-Colell [21] show almost sure convergence of the empirical frequencies of play to the set of correlated equilibria in this case, and Foster and Young [12] show convergence in probability of the mixed action profiles to the set of -Nash equilibria of two player games. It is their ideas that we extend here.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the experimental regret testing procedure. Section 3 shows some basic properties, including that empirical frequencies converge to the convex hull of the set of -Nash equilibria. The main convergence results are in Sections 4-6.
Section 6 deals with the case in which players observe their own realized payoffs but not other players' actions. Section 7 contains the proofs.
Preliminary definitions
We consider N -player normal form games, where N also denotes the set of players {1, .., N }. S i denotes player i's space of pure actions with cardinality K i = #S i , and S = × i∈N S i denotes the space of pure action profiles with cardinality K = i∈N K i ; Σ i denotes the set of probability measures (or mixed actions) on S i , Σ = × i∈N Σ i denotes the space of mixed action profiles.
Set also S −i = × j =i S j and Σ −i = × j =i Σ j , and for J ⊂ N , S J = × i∈J S i and
Given N and each K i finite, we identify a game with a point in Euclidean Let B i (γ) ⊂ Σ denote the graph of i's best reply correspondence at γ and
denotes the set of Nash equilibria and N (γ) = ∩ i∈N B i (γ) the set of -Nash equilibria of γ. Let N c (γ) = Σ \ N (γ) denote its complement in Σ; we will often suppress the argument γ. µ denotes uniform probability measure over either Σ or [0, 1] κN , according to the context.
The following learning dynamics is based on the regret testing dynamics of Foster and Young [12] and coincides with it when λ = 0.
Definition 1 Experimental regret testing with parameters (T, ρ, λ),
where T ∈ N, ρ ∈ R ++ , and λ ∈ (0, 1), is defined by the following algorithm. (b) Each player computes its vector of average regrets over the T periods
where s τ = (s In words, experimental regret testing with parameters (T, ρ, λ) is defined by an updating algorithm, where every T periods each player computes its vector of recent average regrets. If one of the components exceeds ρ, then a new action is drawn from the uniform distribution on the player's action simplex, and this action is played for the next T periods. If, on the other hand, none of the components exceeds ρ, then, with probability 1 − λ, it continues to play according to the previous action for further T periods, and, with probability λ, a new action is drawn from the uniform distribution on the action simplex and is played for the next T periods.
Note that while the procedure of experimental regret testing is clearly uncoupled in the sense that the actions of each player only depend on the players' own past payoffs and not on the payoffs of the other players (see Hart and Mas-Colell [23, 24] ), it also requires some amount of coordination, since it is assumed that all players use the same parameters (T, ρ, λ) and that the intervals of length T over which they keep their mixed actions fixed are synchronized.
The difference of this dynamics from the regret testing dynamics of Foster and Young is that in our case, with a small positive probability λ, players select a new action even if their current action does not lead to regrets above the threshold ρ. This ensures that there is some amount of experimentation by all the players throughout the learning process.
Properties of experimental regret testing
We state some key properties of experimental regret testing that will be used throughout the paper. The proofs are all in Section 7.
One of the key properties of experimental regret testing needed to prove such convergence is that the process of mixed action profiles σ 0 , σ T , σ 2T , . . . is a geometrically mixing Markov chain, as summarized in the following lemma.
Denote by µ the uniform probability measure over the set Σ of mixed action profiles.
Lemma 1
The stochastic process {σ t }, t = 0, T, 2T, . . . , defined by experimental regret learning with 0 < λ < 1, is a recurrent and irreducible (L 1 )
Markov chain satisfying Doeblin's condition. In particular, for any measur-able set A ⊂ Σ, 
Then there exists a unique probability distribution π over Σ (the stationary distribution of the Markov process) such that
where the supremum is taken over all measurable sets A ⊂ Σ.
The main idea behind Foster and Young's heuristics is that, after a not very long search period, by pure chance, the mixed action profile σ mT will be an -Nash equilibrium, and then, since all players have a small expected regret, the process gets stuck with this value for a much longer time than the search period. The main technical result needed to justify such a statement is summarized in Lemma 3 which will imply that the length of the search period is negligible compared to the length of time the process spends in an -Nash equilibrium. A similar result was used by Foster and Young [12] for the case of two players.
Throughout the paper we work with generic games in the following sense.
, and where the payoffs are the ones induced by γ, that is, γ = γ |S . For an arbitrary set J ⊂ N and arbitrary mixed action profile σ J ∈ Σ J , let γ σ J , denote the subgame where players in J play the fixed mixed action σ J . We call an N -player normal form game γ ∈ [0, 1] κN generic if every pure subgame has only regular Nash equilibria and for every pure subgame γ of γ, we have for almost every mixed action profile σ J ∈ Σ J , J ⊂ N , that the subgame γ σ J of γ also only has regular Nash equilibria. The notion of regular Nash equilibrium we use is as in Ritzberger [33] or van Damme [36] ; essentially we require that the system of equations defining a given equilibrium be invertible.
Let N c (γ) = Σ \ N (γ) denote the complement of the set of -Nash equilibria. The next lemma is essential for the convergence results.
there exist positive constants c 1 , c 2 such that, for all sufficiently small ρ > 0, the N -step transition probabilities of experimental regret testing satisfy
(where we use the notation
the N -step transition probabilities).
One more technical result is needed before we state the main properties of experimental regret testing.
The next basic proposition shows that after sufficiently many rounds of play the distribution of the joint mixed actions σ concentrates in the neighborhood of the set of Nash equilibria. It extends the main result of Foster and Young [12] to generic games of an arbitrary number of players.
κN be a generic N -player normal form game.
There exists a positive number 0 such that for all < 0 the following holds:
there exist positive constants c 1 , . . . , c 4 such that if the experimental regret testing procedure is used with parameters
An implication of this theorem concerns the long-term joint empirical frequencies of play. If all players play according to the experimental regret testing procedure, then the joint empirical frequencies of play converge almost surely to a mixed action profile P that is in the convex hull of -Nash equilibria taken in ∆(S).
Recall that, for each i ∈ N , τ = 1, 2, . . ., s i τ ∈ S i is the pure action played by the ith player, and where s i τ is drawn randomly according to the mixed action σ i mT whenever τ ∈ {mT + 1, . . . , (m + 1)T }. Consider the joint empirical distribution of plays P t defined by
Denote the convex hull taken in ∆(S) by co(·). We can state the following. 
Remark. (initialization).
In the definition of experimental regret testing we assumed that each player chooses its initial mixed action σ i 0 uniformly at random. The reason for the choice of the uniform distribution is merely simplicity, and it is easy to see that Proposition 1 remains true under the weaker assumption that the distribution of σ 0 is absolutely continuous with respect to the uniform measure on Σ. This observation will be relevant in Section 4.
Remark. (uncoupledness). Corollary 2 guarantees, for any fixed , the existence of parameters (T, ρ, λ) such that the empirical frequencies of play converge to N . Moreover, it is clear from the proof that these parameters depend not only on but also on properties of the overall game, and therefore, the procedure using these parameters is not uncoupled. In a fully uncoupled procedure, the players should be able to determine the parameters based solely on the value of . In the following sections we introduce fully uncoupled versions of this strategy. Proposition 1 should be treated as a main technical tool for further analysis.
Remark. (rates of convergence). The bounds established in Proposition 1 also allow us to estimate the length of play M T , as a function of , to achieve that the mixed action profile is an -Nash equilibrium with a probability at least 1 − . The bounds reveal that experimental regret testing with appropriately chosen parameters achieves this after O (1/ ) C rounds of play where the constant C depends, in a complicated way, on the properties of the game. However, a closer look at the proof reveals that C is at least proportional with K = N i=1 K i (the sum of the number of actions of all players) and therefore the speed of convergence is at least exponentially slow as a function of the number of players and the number of actions of each player. This slow rate of convergence is in sharp contrast with the rates of convergence achievable to approximate correlated equilibria. In fact, it follows from results of Cesa-Bianchi and Lugosi [6] that there exists an uncoupled way of play such that, after O( −2 log(K/ )) rounds of play the joint empirical frequencies of play form, with probability at least 1 − , an -correlated equilibrium.
Convergence in generic games
The purpose of this section is to derive a regret-based method that guarantees that the mixed action profiles σ t , t = 1, 2, . . . converge almost surely to the set N of Nash equilibria of a generic game. Thus, we not only claim convergence of the empirical frequencies of plays but also of the actual mixed action profiles σ t . Also, we show convergence to N and not only to the convex hull co(N ) of -Nash equilibria for a fixed . Actually, our proposed method guarantees convergence of {σ t } to just one Nash equilibrium, though in case of multiple Nash equilibria the limiting equilibrium may depend on the actual (random) realization of the sequence of plays.
The basic idea is to "anneal" experimental regret testing such that first it is used with some parameters (T 1 , ρ 1 , λ 1 ) for a number M 1 of periods of length T 1 , then change the parameters to (T 2 , ρ 2 , λ 2 ) (by increasing T and decreasing ρ and λ properly), use experimental regret testing for a number M 2 M 1 of periods (of length T 2 ), etc. However, this is not sufficient to guarantee almost sure convergence as at each change of parameters the process is reinitialized and therefore there is an infinite set of indices t such that σ t is far away from any Nash equilibrium. The solution we propose is a careful modification of experimental regret testing that guarantees that for any , σ t / ∈ N only occurs a finite number of times, almost surely. This is achieved by "localizing" the search after each change of parameters such that each player limits its choice to a small neighborhood of the mixed action played right before the change of parameters (unless a player experiences a large regret in which case the search is extended again to the whole simplex).
Another challenge we must face is that the values of the parameters of the procedure (i.e., T , ρ , λ , and M , = 1, 2, . . .) cannot depend on the parameters of the game, since by requiring uncoupledness we must assume that the players only know their payoff function but not those of the other players.
Next we define the annealed localized experimental regret testing process. To this end, let 1 > 2 > · · · be a decreasing sequence of positive numbers such that The main result of this section is the following theorem which establishes almost sure convergence of the procedure described above to Nash equilibria. In case of multiple Nash equilibria the value of the limit may depend on the randomization used in the procedure.
Remark. (annealing and localization). As mentioned above, annealing and localization are both necessary to get almost sure convergence to (exact) Nash equilibrium. Localization allows players who are experiencing small regrets over long periods of time to narrow their search (including experimentation) to decreasing neighborhoods of the low-regret actions. It is important to make sure these neighborhoods eventually always contain a Nash equilibrium of the game. The distinction of case (c2) ensures that localization does not have players searching too frequently within neighborhoods not containing a Nash equilibrium.
Remark. (uncoupledness revisited). Note that the procedure is fully uncoupled as the only parameter is the sequence { } ∞ =1 , which is independent of the properties of the game. This is to be contrasted with the corresponding remark after Corollary 2.
Remark. (plausible strategies). The specific parameters given in the definition of the procedure of annealed experimental regret testing make it unlikely that one finds agents under "natural" circumstances that follow such a strategy. While we recognize that the specific details of the procedure may be quite unnatural, we emphasize that the main message of this paper is that there exists an uncoupled strategy that leads to Nash equilibrium for "most" games even in the model of unknown games, and Theorem 1 should be regarded as an existence result, not more. Nevertheless, the main ingredients of the procedure, such as random search, experimentation, and localization are quite natural, and appear in many learning systems. As an interesting topic for future research, it remains to see whether there exist more attractive uncoupled procedures that lead to Nash equilibrium. In particular, it would be important to find strategies that do not require synchronization between the players.
Non-generic games
All results presented up to this point require the game to be generic in the sense specified above. However, since almost all games are generic (with respect to the Lebesque measure over the set [0, 1] κN of all games), it is easy to construct a randomized uncoupled procedure such that convergence to an -Nash equilibrium is achieved for all games.
Theorem 2 Let γ ∈ [0, 1] κN be an arbitrary N -player normal form game and let > 0. There exists an uncoupled randomized learning procedure such that the mixed action profiles converge almost surely to a profile σ ∈ Σ that is an -Nash equilibrium of γ.
Proof. The idea is that before starting to play, each player slightly perturbes the values of its payoff function and then plays as if its payoff were the perturbed values. For example, define, for each player i ∈ N and pure action
where the U i,s are i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed in the interval [− , ]. Clearly, the perturbed gameγ is generic almost surely. Therefore, if all players play according to annealed localized experimental regret testing described in Section 4 but based on the payoffs ofγ, then by Theorem 1 the mixed action profiles σ t converge, with probability one, to a Nash equilibrium ofγ. However, since for all i ∈ N , s ∈ S, we have |γ
Nash equilibrium ofγ is an -Nash equilibrium of γ.
Remark. (nash convergence for all games). Even though we only
prove convergence to -Nash equilibria in the case of non-generic games, it seems plausible that, by a refinement of the same idea as in Theorem 2, it is also possible to achieve almost sure convergence to exact Nash equilibria. The idea is that, in annealed localized experimental regret testing, each time the parameters (T , ρ , λ ) are updated, the payoffs of the game γ are perturbed by a new noise U (i,s), whose magnitude decreases with in an appropriately calibrated way. However, such a calibration is far from being trivial, as it requires a fine control of the constants from Lemma 5 and we leave its study for future research.
Unknown games
Next we show that all the results shown up to this point extend easily to the significantly more general case where the actions of each player can depend only on own past realized payoffs, without seeing the actions taken by the rest of the players. This model is sometimes referred to as "unknown game"
as the players need not be aware of any characteristics of the game, like, for example, the number of overall players or the number of actions other players can choose from. [12] show that their regret testing procedure adapts to the unknown game model. Their idea also extends to our modifications. In order to adjust the procedures of experimental regret testing and annealed localized experimental regret testing, note that the only place in which the players look at the past is when they calculate the regrets r i t,k in (1). However, each player may also estimate its regret in a simple way: at each time instant, player i flips a biased coin and if the outcome is head (whose probability is very small), then instead of choosing an action according to the mixed action σ i t , it chooses one uniformly. At these time instants, the player collects sufficient information to estimate the regret with respect to each fixed action
To 
The regret r i t,k may be estimated by profiles converge almost surely to a profile σ ∈ Σ that is a Nash equilibrium ( -Nash equilibrium) of the game γ.
Remark. (bayesian games)
. The unknown game model can be adapted to encompass the case of Bayesian games, i.e., where payoffs depend on action profiles chosen as well as players' types. The latter are assumed to be drawn by nature from a finite set and according to a fixed distribution. We only need to require that (i) agents observe their own types and can condition their actions on those types, and (ii) the game is repeated such that at every period nature newly selects the types according to the given distribution.
For every block of T periods, agents play fixed conditional actions, which are resampled if regrets over the previous T periods exceed the regret threshold and are kept unchanged otherwise (up to the experimentation probability λ). Given that the performance of the conditional actions is (unbiasedly) estimated during play, the present approach does not assume players to have any priors concerning nature's move, but rather to obtain them through repeated play. Players here are quite naive with respect to other players' actions and types, yet play converges to Bayesian Nash equilibria, in the different senses of Theorems 1 and 2 and of Corollary 2. This is to be contrasted with the belief-based learning approaches, such as, for example, Jordan [26, 27] , Dekel, Fudenberg, and Levine [7] , or also Kalai and Lehrer [29] , Fudenberg and Levine [13] , and Nachbar [31] .
Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. To see that the process is a Markov chain, note that at each m = 0, 1, 2, . . . , σ mT depends only on σ (m−1)T and the regrets r
it is irreducible since at each 0, T, 2T, . . . , the probability of reaching some σ mT ∈ A for any open set A ⊂ Σ from any σ (m−1)T ∈ Σ is strictly positive when λ > 0, and it is recurrent since E[ ∞ m=0 1 {σ mT ∈A} |σ 0 ∈ A] = ∞ for all σ 0 ∈ A. The Doeblin condition follows simply from the presence of the "exploration parameter" λ in the definition of experimental regret testing. In particular, with probability λ N every player chooses a mixed action randomly and, conditioned on this event, the distribution of σ mT is uniform.
Proof of Lemma 2. Harsanyi [17] shows that almost every game has a finite (and odd) number of Nash equilibria all of which are regular. all Nash equilibria regular.
Lemmas 4 and 5. The proof of Lemma 3 is based on two lemmas. Lemma 4 is the key in extending Foster and Young's results to the case of more than two players. It is concerned with the probabilities of moving from a situation where exactly J < N agents have expected regret less than or equal to ρ (and are playing a profile that is not part of an ρ-Nash equilibrium of γ) to a situation where J − 1 or less agents have expected regret less than or equal to ρ. Specifically, it shows that with positive probability, bounded away from zero, the (N − J) agents with expected regret greater than ρ will select a action such that (at least) one of the agents in J will also have expected regret greater than ρ in the next period. This is expressed using the sets
Lemma 5 shows some basic properties of the volume and geometric structure of -Nash equilibria in generic games. Recall that for J ⊂ N , Σ J = × i∈J Σ i . Without loss we assume 
Proof. (a) Fix γ ∈ [0, 1] κN generic and let 
where the sets U (σ; ), σ ∈ N , satisfy
(ii) the sets U (σ; ) are pairwise disjoint and, are defined by a finite number of hypersurfaces (of dimension K − 2; recall dimΣ = K − 1); moreover, except for the hypersurfaces defining Σ, which are fixed, all the others are parameterized by such that the Hausdorff distance d(Σ \ U (σ, ), σ) is strictly increasing in for small.
Because the equations
, that bound the sets U (σ; ), vary smoothly with , it follows that d(Σ \ U (σ, ), σ) is increasing and Lipschitz continuous in . Moreover, the genericity assumption implies that the gradient of the functions norm, we obtain that the slope of the Hausdorff distance d(Σ\U (σ, ), σ) with respect to is positive and bounded away from zero. Thus there exist positive constants (b) This follows immediately given the statement and proof of (a). Since σ is a point in Σ, we have
whether σ is in the interior or on the boundary of Σ. In particular, we have,
and we can take c 3 = c
(c) From (a) we have for any > 0 small, 
where c 2 ≥ c 1 . For the volume we have,
where such that, for any ρ > 0,
Proof of Proposition 1. First note that by Corollary 1,
so that it suffices to bound the measure of N c under the stationary probability π. Clearly,
Writing π(N c ρ ) = 1 − π(N ρ ) and solving for π(N ρ ), we have
where
To bound P (N ) (N → N ρ ) note that if σ mT ∈ N then the expected regret of all players is at most . Since the regret estimates r i mT,k are sums of T independent random variables taking values between 0 and 1 with mean at most , Hoeffding's inequality [25] implies that
Then the probability that there is at least one player i and a action k
with probability at least (1 − λ)
, all players keep playing the same mixed action and therefore
Consequently, since ρ > , we have P (N → N ρ ) ≥ P (N → N ) and hence
(where we assumed λ ≤ 1 and Ke −2T (ρ− ) 2 ≤ 1). Thus, using (4) and the obtained estimate, we have
Next we need to show that, for proper choice of the parameters, P (N ) (N c ρ → N ρ ) is sufficiently large. For generic games of N players, this follows from Lemma 3 which asserts that
for some positive constants C 1 and C 2 that depend on the game. Hence, from (3) we obtain 
In summary,
for some positive constants C 1 , . . . , C 6 . Substituting the choices of the parameters ρ, λ, T with sufficiently large constants c 1 , . . . , c 6 we have
Proof of Corollary 2. Let s i (s) ∈ S i denote player i's action in the action profile s ∈ S, and let σ i (s i (s)) denote the probability player i's mixed action σ i assigns to the action profile s. We can then write the probability of action profile s occurring under mixed action profile σ as
Next, observe that by martingale convergence, for every s ∈ S,
Therefore, it suffices to prove convergence of 1 t t τ =1 P (σ τ ). Since σ τ is unchanged during periods of length T , we obviously have
By Lemma 1 the process {σ mT } ∞ m=0 is a recurrent and irreducible Markov chain, so the ergodic theorem for Markov chains (see, e.g., [32] It remains to show that P ∈ co(N ). By the ergodic theorem and continuity of P , in fact, P = Σ P (σ)dπ, where π is the (unique) stationary distribution of the Markov process {σ mT } ∞ m=0 (on Σ).
Let < be a positive number such that {P ∈ ∆(S) : ∃P ∈ co(N ) such that P − P 1 < } ⊂ co(N )
where · 1 denotes the L 1 distance between probability measures in ∆(S).
Observe that, for a generic game, such an always exists by part (a) of Lemma 5. In fact, one may choose = /c 3 for a sufficiently large positive constant c 3 (whose value depends on the game).
Now choose the parameters (T, ρ, λ) such that π(N c ) < . Proposition 1 guarantees the existence of such a choice.
Clearly,
Since N P (σ)dπ ∈ co(N ), we have that the L 1 distance of P and co(N ) We need to show that event A occurs almost surely for all but finitely many regimes ∈ N. To see this, we show that the probability of event A +1 is high given event A , and that, given event A c , the process almost surely reaches A 0 for some finite 0 > .
Fix the -th regime, ∈ N, and consider the events C = {r Proof. We show that, with large probability, r i mT,k is close to r i mT,k . To this end, note first that
On the other hand, observe that, if there is no time instant τ for which U i,τ = 1 and U j,τ = 1 for some j = i, then,
is an unbiased estimate of Thus, in the unknown game model, the estimate of inequality (5) can be replaced by that of Lemma 6. It is easy to see by inspecting the proofs that the rest of the arguments go through without modification.
